Nothing is as secure as a string phone. – The NSA
This is alpha-quality software, and it’s alpha-quality security software, at that, which is at least ten times more dangerous. Don’t use it for anything where people are going to die if I got something wrong, or even where people are going to be mildly inconvenienced. Just use it for your quantified self dashboards until it gets super famous and is reviewed a bit more.
String phone is a secure communications protocol and library geared towards embedded devices. Its goal is to allow, for example, your mobile phone to communicate with your home automation devices in a secure manner, even over an insecure channel. It also allows for authentication of devices, so you can be sure that the only device whose commands will be accepted is the phone.
String phone isn’t a communication layer itself. Rather, it sits over your communication layer, encrypting and signing messages as required before they are sent over your channel. It also verifies and decrypts incoming messages, ensuring that devices are who they claim to be, and that no third party can read your communications.
Since complicated things tend to be less secure, string phone aims to have a very simple interface:
>>> key = stringphone.generate_topic_key() >>> alice = stringphone.Topic(topic_key=key) >>> bob = stringphone.Topic(topic_key=key) >>> message = alice.encode(b"Hi bob!") # "s\xa7\xdf\xc3x\x19\x96\xd4..." >>> bob.decode(message, naive=True) # `naive` skips signature verification b"Hi bob!"
With embedded devices, the internet of things, and ubiquitous computing becoming so common that I bet you didn’t notice those three words refer to the exact same thing, there’s an increasing need for security when these devices communicate with each other. The most common approach so far has been to just not use security at all, because it’s more convenient. String phone aims to make security so convenient that you won’t have an excuse to not use it. All you need to do to secure your devices’ communications in the simple case is to generate a key and store it on each one, and call two methods to encode/decode messages before transmission. That’s it.
This specific library is written in Python as a proof-of-concept and initial implementation of the underlying protocol, so it can be refined and improved. Python isn’t very appropriate for running on embedded devices, as it’s suitable for pretty much only the ones running Linux, like Raspberry Pi and the like. However, the intention is that the library will be ported to other languages like Java, Objective C/Swift and C, so it can be used on other platforms.
(If you are too impatient for the theory, skip to Getting started to... get started)
String phone’s communication primitive is a
Topic. Think of a topic as a room where many devices are
shouting at each other. This can be an MQTT queue, a pub/sub channel, an IRC
channel, or even a single socket (one-to-one communication is a subset of
Each device in the topic is called a participant. Each participant has its own, persistent elliptic curve key, that is kept secret from other participants and anyone else. This key is top secret, and should not be shared with any person or device. It should never leave the participant’s storage. This key is used to identify the participant and to sign the participant’s messages so other participants are sure of who is sending them.
Each topic also has a persistent encryption key, called a topic key. The topic key ensures that all communcations between participants are securely encrypted. The topic key should only be known to the participants. Anyone with the topic key can read all messages exchanged in the topic without being detected.
Since you’ve made it this far, you can continue to the Introduction.
No security library can be complete without a list of its weaknesses, so you know what to avoid. Since the protocol is geared towards embedded devices, it strives to be simple, so it lacks many bells and whistles that may not be necessary or useful to everyone. You may have to implement these yourself, on top of string phone, or just be aware of them.
Here’s what you need to watch out for:
- There is no replay protection at all. Anyone can record and replay a message at any time. If you want to guard against replays, make sure to include a sequence number or timestamp in your message, and discard commands that are too old or out of sequence.
- There is no forward secrecy. Once a participant has joined a topic, they can read all future and past messages that they may have. The only way to get rid of them is to create a new topic with a new key and move everyone over.
- Salsa20 has a 64-bit nonce, which may be too small when sending many small messages. This may be worth keeping in mind if you’re worried about nonce reuse.
- Many more things that I’m sure will come up soon.